Lucretius and Doxography 1. Let us commence this brief investigation with a typically Lucretian passage, baok V, lines 1204-1240. 1 True piety, the poet has ju st said (1203), is to contemplate the world with a mind at peace. But where then does mankind's awful reverence for and fear of the gods come from? When we gaze at the star-studded heavens and the motions of the sun and moon, we start to wonder whether these movements are not caused by the immense power of the gods, and so add yet another care to our already burdened souis. The poverty of our thought (egestas rationis) brings our minds to doubt. Did the world have an origin, and will it have an end, or will divinity endow it with everlasting safety, defying the vast powers of time? Turning to earthly phenomena, Lucretius powerfully evokes the terror of the mind when confronted with thunderbolts, hurricanes and earthquakes. Is it any wonder that mankind, in order to account for these phenomena, resorts to belief in the wondrous powers of divine beings who govern all that takes place?
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The poet, we observe, does not dweIl on the invention or discovery of philosophy as part of the advance of civilization. In Plato's Timaeus, contemplation of the heavens had led to the practice of philosophy, the greatest gift of the gods to mankind.
2 For Lucretius observation of the heavenly phenomena has a quite different result. It leads to fear and superstition, exactly that mind-set which Epicurus' philosophy and his own poem will be able to placate and remove.
My theme is Lucretius and doxography. In that perspective I certainly am not going to contend that the text I have just paraphrased is a doxographical passage. What I will argue is that its formulation has been demonstrably influenced by Lucretius ' knowledge of the doxographical tradition. This is not the time or place to give a fuIl treatment of the rather large subject indicated by my title. What I airn to do is give some pointers. These will hopefully be useful for scholars who are investigating the thought, structure and sources of Lucretius' poem.
through the gradual development of scholarly usage, it has come to have a broad spectrum of meaning. 4 In this paper I am going to take the term in the narrowest possible sense, i.e. as referring to a tradition of writings called the Placita. This term, together with its Greek equivalent 'tà àpÉrrKov'ta and the parallel terms Mi;at and opiniones, does have an ancient pedigree, and can be reasonably strictly defined. In order to do so, we need to understand how a long tradition developed. Cognoscenti will recognize that I here draw above all on the wide-ranging research of Jaap Mansfeld, as weIl as on some of my own findings. 5 Grosso modo we can say that it all began with Aristotle' s dialectical method. Before dealing with any particular problem (1tpó~À:rll..La, quaestio) it is sound practice to collect and analyse the views of predecessors, for these can provide positive and negative indications on how to proceed. Analysis of this material results in the organisation of representative opinions on a wide range of subjects, but especially in the area of physics (taken in the broad sense). The Peripatetic school, and especially it seems Theophrastus, took the lead in this,6 but it is c1ear that the practice of assembling doxai became widespread. It is possible to trace -with varying degrees of precision -diverse collections which were exploited by schools and individual philosophers in differing ways. For example, Academics and sceptics not surprisingly stressed the disagreements of the philosophers that the doxai reveaJ.7
What chiefly remains to us today are the Placita of Aëtius, an imperfectly preserved but extensive collection to be dated to the Ist century AD.
8 I mention now three features of this work that are typical for the genre as a whoIe.
(1) The work is divided into books and chapters, which represent a systematically organized whoIe. (2) Individual chapters are almost always structured by means of diaereses, whether as disjunctions or in the form of lists. (3) To each opinion a name-label is attached, i.e. the philosopher who represents the view, but the views take priority over the names. For this reason historical and chronological aspects play but a minor role. To put it crudely, doxography is more systematic than historical in orientation. To this extent it remains true to its Aristotelian heritage.
6 Esp. in his <l>ucrtKui 8óçut, but also elsewhere; cf. Mansfeld (1989b) n. 49, (l990a) 3057 f. 7 On the importance of the OtU<j>COVtU for an understanding of the Placita and their philosophical pediree see Mansfeld (1989a) 314 and passim, Runia (1989) 269.
For a detailed account of how the lost original is to be reconstructed, see now Mansfeld & Runia (1996). The main sources are PS.Plutarch Placita philosophorum, Stobaeus Eclogae hook I, Theodoret of Cyrrhus Curatio affectionum Graecarum. The double columns of Dieis' reconstruction, (1879), should be used with caution. Aëtius' compendium makes extensive use of anterior traditions, some of which Diels was able to trace in Cicero and other sources, and which he labelled the Vetusta placita, dating them to the fust half of the Ist century AD. Even older traditions, i.e. Vetustissima placita, have been identified in Chrysippus; see Mansfeld (1989a) . Ultimately, however, the method and some material goes back to Aristotle and Theophrastus. sense outlined above. Lucretius does not canvas views and analyse them before determining his own position. He states the doctrine of Epicurus, supports it with arguments, and then of ten reinforces his position by attacking other views. lt is true that his tone is generally rather adversarial, and he quite of ten adduces imaginary opponents in a rather vague way.9 But direct mention of the names of such philosophical opponents is rare indeed. There are only four cases. In the second half of book I we find the long discussions of the Presocratic theories of first principles, in which the names of Heraclitus, Empedocles and Anaxagoras are squeezed into hexameter verse. JO The other philosopher is Democritus. Twice Lucretius uses the same hexameter, II Democriti quod sancta viri sententia ponit, indicating by means of the word sancta that the views of the atomist are to be respected, if not folIo wed in every respect. The term sententia, used elsewhere only once,12 surely translates the Greek doxa, the only case of specifically doxographical terminology 1 have found in Lucretius. A fifth name-label might be suspected at V.727, where we read the Babylonica Chaldaeum doctrina.
13 I will be retuming to this text below. lt is instructive to compare Lucretius with a fellow-sectarian who also writes for a general audience. On his wall Diogenes of Oenoanda names no less than eighteen philosophers, including Plato, Aristotle and Zeno the StoiC. 14 It will be agreed, therefore, that the general way in which Lucretius presents the ratio speciesque of nature from an Epicurean perspective is rather different from the doxographical method as we have outlined it above. To phrase the matter succinctly, Lucretius' method is dogmatic and refutatory, not dialectical and doxographical.
4. But it would obviously be quite wrong to leave matters at this. Allow me first to return to the passage with which I began. We note the example that Lucretius gives of the poverty of human thought: is the cosmos generated and destined to perish, or will it remain in existence forever, sustained by divine maintenance (V.1213-1217)? This disjunctive diaeresis is one of the stock questions that finds its way in countless dialectical and doxographical texts, beg inning with Aristotle, but even having a precedent in Plato's Timaeus . 15 Particularly apposite examples are found in Lucretius' contemporaries Varro and Cicero. 16 It is a standard example used by the sceptics to show the futility of dogmatism. 17 Perhaps there is a reminder of this in the poet's phrase that 'the poverty of human thought brings the mind to doubt' (V.1211). Lucretius, however, is convinced that he has the answer. The world had a beg inning and a single day will wipe it out (V.95).
The same theme recurs at the end of book Il, but is here placed in a wider physical context. Lucretius argues the case for the following doctrines:
-The uni verse is infinite in all directions (l 047-1066).
Worlds different than ours are infinite in number (l 067 -1089). Nature is free and there is no divine providence (1090-1104).
The cosmos is bom, reaches its acme through sustenance by food, and will reach a terminal age (1105-1174).
The subjects and their sequence of treatment remind us strongly of the first chapters of book Il of Aëtius' doxographical compendium: 18 a' IIEpt KócrllOU
The resemblance is stronger if we bear in mind that in Il.1 Aëtius deals with the question whether there is one cosmos or an infinite number, and specifically points out the distinction between cosmos and universe. In IlA he also deals with the question of whether the cosmos is generated or not, and what the connection is with the theme of providence discussed in the previous chapter. We note that Lucretius does not actually mention the question of the shape of the various worlds, but it is, I think, implicit in his assertion that there are 'other worlds in other regions' (Il.1075). Tucked away in Jaap Mansfeld's magisterial 1990 Aufstieg article on doxography and dialectic is a brief section on Lucretius. 19 He demonstrated beyond all possible doubt that the introductory sec ti on raising the question of the nature of the soul in book land the full discussion of the subject in book III reveal influence of the standard schemata of doxography, especially as seen in the use of question-types. 20 Also the discussion of the principles in book I is organized by means of a standard procedure, starting with various monists including Heraclitus (635-704), following with dualists (712) and proponents of four elements (714), foremost among whom is Empedocles (716-829), and ending with the infinitist Anaxagoras (830-920). He concurs with the view of Rösler th at the material on the Presocratics is also not aeternitate mundi. On the initial doxography in paragraphs 7-19 see Pépin (1964) drawn from direct reading, but is derived from doxographic traditions. 21 Mansfeld concludes as follows: 22 'just as Cicero and others, Lucretius avails hirnself of the doxographic material to discuss problems in philosophy better.' I could not agree more. Doxography is used for the purpose of organizing philosophical material. By outlining various systematic options in the areas of principles, cosmology and psychology, Lucretius makes the answers fixed once and for all by Epicurus stand out in higher relief.
At the broader level of macro-organization there are further parallels between Lucretius' poem and the Placita in Aëtius. In the following 1', nEpi ppoV'trov, àO"1:punrov, KEpuuvrov, nPTlO"tij pwv tE Kui tucpmvwv 8', nEpi VEcprov, UE'troV, Xtóvwv, xu'A.uçrov E', nEpi ïpt80ç Ç'; nEpi àVÉIlWV Tl, nEpi XEtllrovoÇ KUi 8Épouç tE', nEpi O"ElO"llroV yilç tç', nEpi 8u'A.á't'tTlç, nroç O"uvÉO"'tTl Kui nroç èO"n mKpá u ', nEpi NEi'A.ou àvupáO"EWÇ (Book IV)
The parallelism is virtually complete, and cannot be a matter of coincidence. We note too that in the passage from book V that we quoted at the outset Lucretius retains the same sequence of problems: thunderbolts, hurricanes, earthquakes (1218-1240). There are also parallels between the presentation of the heavenly phenomena in book V and book 11 of Aëtius, but they are not as close. In one respect, however, there is a significant difference between the macro-organization of the Placita tradition and Lucretius' poem. The Placita move from the subject of principles to the macrocosm and finally to the microcosm, i.e. man (and other terrestrial animais). Lucretius chooses to deal with the subjects of the soul, sensation and sex in the rniddle books before he treats cosmology and metereology in the final two. At the outset of the poem (1.127-135) he had announced the reverse order, i.e. that used in the Placita (which basically goes back to Plato's Tirnaeus and Aristotle's school works). Many scholars have argued that this indicates an alteration of plan on the poet's part. 24 But the fact that Epicurus in his Letter to Herodotus had also dealt with sensation and the soul before moving to cosmology makes such a far-reaching conclusion far from compelling. 
phenomena presented by Lucretius in Books V and VI. In the Placita a vast array of differing views on and explanations of such phenomena is presented, each associated with a different philosopher (i.e. given a specific name-Iabel).26 Lucretius exploits these views, but drops the name-labels (except in the cases mentioned above of the sententia Democriti and the Chaldaeum doctrina). Most of ten no single explanation of these phenomena can be given on account of the limitations of hu man perceptionY Usually called Lucretius ' doctrine of a 'plurality of causes',28 in reality the name is somewhat of a misnomer. 29 For each phenomenon there is a single operative cause, but if there is a lack of evidence (bnl!up't6PTJ<Hç or d.vLll!up't6PTJ<Hç in the terminology of Epicurus' epistemology), then it cannot be determined which of the various alternatives it actually is. 30 The substantial parallels between Lucretius' explanations and the material collected in Aëtius encourages the conclusion that the poet has drawn on the doxographical tradition as a fertile source of theories on the various phenomena he wished to discuss. What is remarkable is that he should thereby turn to many antiquated or even antiquarian views, instead of using what was available in contemporary scientific manuals. 3 1 S. But it may well be th at by now I am making excessive demands on the patience of the reader. Should I not be taking into consideration Lucretius' dependence on the writings of Epicurus? Af ter all he explicitly claims to be culling all his doctrine from the writings of the master, the inventor rerum (1I1.9-11)? Does it make sen se to explore the subject of Lucretius and doxography without taking into account the relation that his guide Epicurus himself had to that same doxographical tradition ?
The significant parallels between Epicurus' three surviving letters and the tradition of the Placita are in deed obvious. In terms of content Usener pointed out many of these connections in the valuable appendix to his Epicurea, including many additional references to passages in Lucretius. 32 Bergsträsser's Meteorological Fragment,33 now published in a superior version by Hans Daiber,34 shows an undeniable connection between Theophrastus, Epicurus, and Lucretius. It is striking that not only does 26 Partial exceptions are long accounts on the rainbow (III.6) and halo (III.18) with alrnost no namelabels. 27 See for example V.620-638 . 28 E.g. Bailey (1947) Theophrastus leave out all name-labels, but he also admits a multiplicity of explanations and refers copiously to analogies from our own experience. In terms of method an important contribution was made by Jaap Mansfeld very recently in an article entitled 'Epicurus Peripateticus'.35 He shows convincingly by careful examination of passages in the Letter to Pythocles that Epicurus was acquainted with the dialectical method of Aristotle and Theophrastus, which he adapts for his own use, taking over not only terminology, but also techniques such as the diaeresis. For example the passage on what a cosmos is contains diaereses on shape and movement very similar in method to what we find in the first chapters of Aëtius, book II.36 In setting out an unresolved variety of views Epicurus is not trying to sift out the opinions of previous philosophers, nor is his intention sceptical in the proper sense, i.e. in order to show that the true state of affairs is inaccessible to the hu man mind. He wishes his followers to accept that there are true states of affairs or reasons for cosmological and meteorological phenomena, but that it is not always possible to determine these precisely when the evidence of sense-perception is inadequate.
This having been said, it must immediately be added that the subject of Epicurus' relation to the doxographical tradition remains fraught with difficulties, which are certainly not lessened when the further question of the relation to the material in Lucretius is added as well. Theophrastus, Epicurus' Letters, Lucretius and the Placita are four separate bodies of writing which do not all ow simple reduction to each other. 37 There are many unknown or unclear factors that have to be taken into account.
Is the Letter to Pythocles authentic (I think the answer to this is yes)? Which works of Theophrastus did Epicurus exploit? Which works of Epicurus did Lucretius draw on? Did he also consult works of so-called younger Epicureans? Did he turn to sources outside the Epicurean tradition ?
Two things at least, I believe, can be said. Firstly, for all Lucretius' devotion to the master, there is not need to assume that he wrote in quarantine, cut off from outside sources of information. Doxography was an important way of doing philosophy in his time. He learnt about the method in part from the master, perhaps also via other Epicurean works. But other sources of access will also have been available to him. Secondly it will be clear that a rigorous examination of the question of the relations between the four above-mentioned bodies of writing, with all due allowance for the uncertainties noted above, remains a real desideratum. It is not something that can be tackled in an article. It requires a full-Iength study. In the present context I shall do no more than set out one particular example, which will illustrate the interest and the difficulties of the task.
6. The example I have chosen is the question of the illumination of the moon. In Aëtius, as one of seven chapters devoted to the moon (II.25-31), we find a chapter 35 Mansfeld (1994) . 36 See ibid. 38-41 with reference to Ep. Pyth. 88-90 (Usener's exclusions are shown to be quite unnecessary). On p. 42 he notes that the diaeresis on the motions of the heavens in Ep . Pyth . 92-93 is paralleled at Lucr. V.509-525. 37 As attempted by Reitzenstein (1924). entitled mopi cpco'ttO"Jlrov O"êÀ:fJVllÇ (H.28). Naturally this particular question cannot be answered in isolation from other questions such as the substance of the moon, its eclipses and its so-called face. It is part of the job of the Placita tradition to introduce clarity into the organization of the discussion, although in this particular case it is rather imperfectly done. Outside Aëtius there is a large body of similar Placita material utilized by other authors. These questions were of course standard fare in scientific discussions. 38 As the elder Pliny informs us, the moon's transformations rack the wits of her ob servers and it shames them that the nearest star should be the one they know least about (Nat. H.4I).
Of particular interest in our context is a striking text found in Philo of Alexandria, which gives a sceptical account of our knowledge of the nature of the heavens and the soul/mind (De somniis 1.21-32) . In order to illustrate the disagreements of the philosophers, Philo presents a large number of conflicting doxai which are parallel to what we find in Aëtius, but for chronological reasons cannot be derived from him. Parallels with Cicero suggest that Philo is drawing on an older collection of doxai (perhaps to be identified with the Vetusta Placita) which was roughly contemporary with Lucretius.
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In book V Lucretius three times refers to the question of the illuminations of the moon. At V.575-578, in discussing the moon's size, which is as it appears to be, he adds a parenthetic remark ab out the source of its light: lunaque sive notho fertur loca lumine lustrans, sive suam proprio iactat de corpore lucem, quidquid id est, nihilo fertur maiore figura quam, nostris oculis qua cemimus, esse videtur.
At 705-750 a sequence of four explanations is given for the illumination and regular phases of the moon. It is possible (1) that she shines with the reflected light of the sun and that the reflection varies in accordance with her position in relation to the sun (705-714), or (2) that she revolves with her own light (proprio cum lumine) and is obscured by the passing of another body (715-719), or (3) that she is like a globe with one half bright and the other half dark which take their tums in facing towards us -the doctrine with which the Babylonian Chaldeans try to refute the science of the astronomers 40 (720-730) -, or (4) that new moons are created every day in a fixed succession of phases (730-750).41 Finally at 768-770 in discussing the phenomenon of lunar eclipses, he again alludes to the possibility that the moon has its own source of light (suo ... Julget ... nitore) which may grow faint in a particular area of the heavens hostile to her radiance (loca luminibus propriis inimica). On these texts I would briefly make the following four comments.
(l) In all doxographic texts the basic diaeresis between the moon as recipient of light from elsewhere and source of its own light is very clear. Lucretius shows his awareness of this and uses it to organize his discussion. Another relevant text is found in Lucian 's lcaromenippus (paragraph 20), where in an adaptation of doxographical material for satirical purposes, the moon is portrayed as complaining th at according to the philosophers she takes her stolen and bastard light (ro <proç KÀ01ttI!UtÓV 'tE KUt vó80v) from the sun. It is a plausible hypothesis, I would argue, that Lucretius drew his formulation not from Epicurus, but from the standard practice of doxographical texts. The fact that Catullus too speaks of the moon as having a 'bastard light' (notho lumine) is further evidence in favour of this view. 45 (3) Another distinctive feature of Lucretius' treatment of the moon is that he refers explicitly to the Babylonian doctrine of the moon as a rotating sphere, half of which is enflamed and so can he seen as it tums towards the earth. This of course is the well-known theory of Berosus, the author of the BuPUÀroVtUKá, a work in three books which informed Hellenistic readers about the history and culture of Babylonia or Chaldea. 46 It is not certain that Berosus presented his astronomical theories in this work, but it may be agreed with Campos Daroca that this is areasonabie view. 47 In order to date Berosus and his work we have only two clues. 48 Firstly, in the preface to his work he presents himself as a contemporary of Alexander the Great, i.e. he 42 No relevant materiaI is fumished in Diogenes of Oenoanda. 43 At Ps.Plut. Plac. 2.27 the contrast is bet ween ïÖlOV <pffiç and U1tO 'toG ftÀ.iou <pOJ'tiÇEcrSUl. 44 ' What about this: does the moon bring forth her own genuine light, or a bastard light iIlumined by the rays of the sun, or neither of these in absolute terms on its own, but rather a mixture of both, as if from a fire that is partly its own and partly from a foreign source.' 45 Carmen 34.14. 46 Fragments are collected by Jacoby in FGH 680. 47 See Campos Daroca (1994), esp. 96. Jacoby separated the astronomical fragments and attributed them to a Hellenistic Ps. Berosus. This theory, which Campos Daroca rejects, would only strengthen our hlpothesis that Lucretius did not gain his information about Berosus via Theophrastus or Epicurus. 4 Ibid. 97. must have been bom weIl before 323 BC, perhaps about 350 Be. Secondly we know that he dedicated his work to Antiochus I Soter, who was co-regent with Seleucus from 293 and sole mIer from 280 tot 262. Combining these two pieces of evidence we might conclude that the work was composed between about 290 and 270. For chonological reasons, therefore, it is most unlikely to have been known to Theophrastus (who died in 287). It is also not so likely that Epicurus would have known it and it certainly was not available to him when he was writing the Physics. 49 Not surprisingly, therefore, Berosus ' theory on the moon is absent from the Letter to Pythocles. 50 On the other hand it is prominently present in the Placita, as weIl as in overtly doxographical passages in Cleomedes and Vitruvius. 51 We may conclude, therefore, that this view, which Lucretius exceptionally gives a name-label, in all likelihood represents a case where Lucretius did draw information from the doxographical tradition as it developed af ter Theophrastus. If his information came from an astronomical handbook, which is not impossible,52 then it must still be said that he has integrated it into a structure that is influenced by the doxographical method.
(4) In his commentary Bailey remarks that, when Lucretius gives multiple explanations for heavenly phenomena, he 'usuaJly pI aces the true explanation first, as though he really preferred it. '53 It is true that in the case of the light and phases of the moon the theory of reflection, which offers the tme explanation is placed first by Lucretius, which is not the case in Aëtius. Nevertheless I find Bailey's remark not very helpful. What does he mean by 'as though'? There is not a single indication that Lucretius, contrary to the teachings of Epicurus, wishes to introduce a criterion of greater or lesser plausibility of causes given. What is important is that there is one true cause, even if it may not even be found among those which he presents. In order to make this doctrine attractive, it helps if the causes given are at least persuasive, and have been suggested by experts in such matters. 54 Hence the value of turning to accepted opinions as collected in doxography.
7. By way of conclusion we make the briefest of returns to the passage in book V with which this paper began. Of course it is not a doxographical passage. Although it uses a very common doxographical diaeresis in order to illustrate the poverty of human thought, its concern is not to set up a framework of answers to philosophical questions. Rather it explains how it happens that men get wrong ideas, attributing celestial and terrestrial phenomena to divine intervention. Nevertheless this passage does in my view shed extra light on why Lucretius found the doxographical tradition attractive. Not only did this tradition supply various altematives as suitable explanations for these phenomena. It is no less important to realize that these are exactly the right kind of answers that the poet (and the philosopher before him) were looking for. Right from its origin in the writings of Aristotle and Theophrastus the doxographical tradition was a body of doctrine with pronounced 'secular' features (to use a somewhat anachronistic terrn).55 Of course it contained a few theological chapters, such as ones on 'who is God' (as principle) and on providence. 56 Such chapters were grist for the Lucretian mill, because he could use their diaereses to make the right answers quite clear. But in the many chapters on puzzling physical phenomena God or the gods do not appear. And that is, in the perception of our poet, exactly how it should beo 55 Theophrastus makes this cIear in an excursus on the causes of thunderbolts which is part of the recently discovered fuller text of his Metarsiology (see above n. 31), paragraph 14.14 ff.: 'neither the thunderbolt nor anything that has been mentioned has its origin in God. For it is not correct to say that God should be the cause of disorder in this world .. .' See further the analysis in Mansfeld (1992b), who at 324-326 dweIIs on the relations between Theophrastus, Epicurus and Lucretius. 56 Aëtius 1.7 ; 11.3. The title of chap. II.6, as given by PS.Plut., <11tO 1t010U 1tpcil'toU O"totxelou i'jpçato KOO')lo1toelv Ö geóç is a cIear exception. The theological bias of this title is probably a late intervention under the influence of Middle Platonism. Originally the title may have been something like 1tógev apxetat Ö KÓO')lOÇ Kai tK 1tOlrov O'totxelrov (this title is actually recorded as a variant in one ms. of Ps.Plut.).
